Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

J. Albrecht, P.A. Gautier, S. Vroman

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3288-3296
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume104
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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Seller
Auctions
Buyers
Private information

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Albrecht, J. ; Gautier, P.A. ; Vroman, S. / Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions. In: American Economic Review. 2014 ; Vol. 104, No. 10. pp. 3288-3296.
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Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions. / Albrecht, J.; Gautier, P.A.; Vroman, S.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 104, No. 10, 2014, p. 3288-3296.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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