Abstract
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3288-3296 |
| Journal | American Economic Review |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue number | 10 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
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