Eliminating interdependences between issues for multi-issue negotiation

Koen Hindriks*, Catholijn M. Jonker, Dmytro Tykhonov

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In multi-issue negotiations, issues may be negotiated independently or not. In the latter case, the utility associated with one issue depends on the value of another. These issue dependencies give rise to more complex, non-linear utility spaces. As a consequence, the computational cost and complexity of negotiating interdependent issues is increased significantly compared to the case of independent issues. Several techniques have been proposed to deal with this increased complexity, including, for example, introducing a mediator in the negotiation setting. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach based on a weighted approximation technique to simplify the utility space. We show that given certain natural assumptions about the outcome of negotiation the application of this technique results in an outcome that closely matches with the outcome based on the original, interdependent utility structure. Moreover, using the approximated utility structure, each of the issues can be negotiated independently which ensures that the negotiation is computationally tractable. The approach is illustrated by applying and testing it in a case study.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCooperative Information Agents X - 10th International Workshop, CIA 2006. Proceedings
PublisherSpringer/Verlag
Pages301-316
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)354038569X, 9783540385691
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006
Externally publishedYes
Event10th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, CIA 2006 - Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Duration: 11 Sep 200613 Sep 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4149 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference10th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, CIA 2006
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityEdinburgh
Period11/09/0613/09/06

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