Epistemic Conservatism beyond mere belief

According to Epistemic Conservatism (EC), the fact that a person has a belief without defeaters is sufficient for assigning a positive epistemic status to that belief. An objection to EC is that it cannot be evaluated because it is impossible to imagine ‘bare beliefs’ in real life, i.e. there are no beliefs that have no connection to other beliefs, personal memory, or epistemic context. I argue that EC is not committed to the existence of ‘bare beliefs’ and that there is a different and better way to evaluate EC. Namely, by considering how well EC accommodates deep-seated epistemic intuitions about holding a belief. I argue that EC accommodates these intuitions well, also in comparison to other theories such as Common Sense epistemology, epistemic self-trust, epistemic entitlement, and phenomenal conservatism. Moreover, I give an explanation for the source of the positive epistemic status for beliefs on EC that involves considering the whole of our cognitive faculties. This also brings with it a new response to the ‘extra-boost objection’ against EC. I conclude that EC can be positively evaluated and can therefore be a useful epistemic theory.