Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability

Chris Ranalli*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review


According to Duncan Pritchard’s Philosophical Issues, 21(1), 434–455, (2011, 2012, 2015)version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one’s knowledge that p is grounded in one’s seeing that p, and one can, by reflection alone, come to know that they see that p. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability is incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. This has the consequence that theories of the nature of sensory experience which accept the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability—such as phenomenal character disjunctivism and certain forms of naïve realism—are inconsistent with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. I then argue that proponents of epistemological disjunctivism face a formidable challenge explaining in what sense, if any, one can have purely reflective knowledge of their factive rational support.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-23
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophia (United States)
Issue number1
Early online date16 Apr 2018
Publication statusPublished - 2018


FundersFunder number
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung


    • Epistemological disjunctivism
    • Introspective indiscriminability
    • Metaphysical disjunctivism
    • Naive realism
    • Reflective knowledge


    Dive into the research topics of 'Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this