Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values

Zhengxing Zou*, René van den Brink

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.

Original languageEnglish
Article number109423
Pages (from-to)1-5
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume194
Early online date15 Jul 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2020

Keywords

  • Axiomatization
  • Cooperative game
  • Equal division value
  • Equal surplus division value

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