Abstract
We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 109423 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-5 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 194 |
| Early online date | 15 Jul 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2020 |
Funding
The authors thank the referee for useful comments on a previous version of the paper. Zhengxing Zou is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 71771025 , 71801016 ) and the China Scholarship Council (Grant No. 201806030046 ).
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities
Keywords
- Axiomatization
- Cooperative game
- Equal division value
- Equal surplus division value
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