Abstract
In multi-objective multi-agent systems (MOMAS), agents explicitlyconsider the possible tradeoffs between conflicting objective func-tions. We argue that compromises between competing objectivesin MOMAS should be analysed on the basis of the utility that thesecompromises have for the users of a system, where an agent’s util-ity function maps their payoff vectors to scalar utility values. Thisutility-based approach naturally leads to two different optimisationcriteria for agents in a MOMAS: expected scalarised returns (ESR)and scalarised expected returns (SER). In this paper, we explorethe differences between these two criteria using the framework ofmulti-objective normal form games (MONFGs). We demonstratethat the choice of optimisation criterion (ESR or SER) can radi-cally alter the set of equilibria in a MONFG when non-linear utilityfunctions are used.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Adaptive and Learning Agents Workshop 2019 (ALA-19) |
Publisher | Vrije Universiteit Brussel |
Pages | 1-9 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2019 |
Event | Adaptive and Learning Agents (ALA) Workshop 2019 at AAMAS, Montreal, Canada - Montreal, Canada Duration: 13 May 2019 → 14 May 2019 |
Publication series
Name | AAMAS series |
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Volume | 11 |
Conference
Conference | Adaptive and Learning Agents (ALA) Workshop 2019 at AAMAS, Montreal, Canada |
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Country/Territory | Canada |
City | Montreal |
Period | 13/05/19 → 14/05/19 |