Equilibria in Multi-Objective Games: a Utility-Based Perspective

Roxana Rădulescu; Patrick Mannion; D.M. Roijers; Ann Nowé

Equilibria in Multi-Objective Games: a Utility-Based Perspective

Roxana Rădulescu, Patrick Mannion, D.M. Roijers, Ann Nowé

Artificial intelligence

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

In multi-objective multi-agent systems (MOMAS), agents explicitlyconsider the possible tradeoffs between conflicting objective func-tions. We argue that compromises between competing objectivesin MOMAS should be analysed on the basis of the utility that thesecompromises have for the users of a system, where an agent’s util-ity function maps their payoff vectors to scalar utility values. Thisutility-based approach naturally leads to two different optimisationcriteria for agents in a MOMAS: expected scalarised returns (ESR)and scalarised expected returns (SER). In this paper, we explorethe differences between these two criteria using the framework ofmulti-objective normal form games (MONFGs). We demonstratethat the choice of optimisation criterion (ESR or SER) can radi-cally alter the set of equilibria in a MONFG when non-linear utilityfunctions are used.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Adaptive and Learning Agents Workshop 2019 (ALA-19)
Publisher	Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Pages	1-9
Number of pages	9
Publication status	Published - Jun 2019
Event	Adaptive and Learning Agents (ALA) Workshop 2019 at AAMAS, Montreal, Canada - Montreal, Canada Duration: 13 May 2019 → 14 May 2019

Publication series

Name	AAMAS series
Volume	11

Conference

Conference	Adaptive and Learning Agents (ALA) Workshop 2019 at AAMAS, Montreal, Canada
Country	Canada
City	Montreal
Period	13/05/19 → 14/05/19

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Rădulescu, R., Mannion, P., Roijers, D. M., & Nowé, A. (2019). Equilibria in Multi-Objective Games: a Utility-Based Perspective. In Adaptive and Learning Agents Workshop 2019 (ALA-19) (pp. 1-9). (AAMAS series; Vol. 11). Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

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Equilibria in Multi-Objective Games : a Utility-Based Perspective. / Rădulescu, Roxana; Mannion, Patrick; Roijers, D.M.; Nowé, Ann.

Adaptive and Learning Agents Workshop 2019 (ALA-19). Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2019. p. 1-9 (AAMAS series; Vol. 11).

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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