Erasable PUFs: Formal Treatment and Generic Design

C. Jin, W. Burleson, M. Van Dijk, U. Rührmair

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

© 2020 ACM.Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have not only been suggested as new key storage mechanism, but - in the form of so-called "Strong PUFs"- also as cryptographic primitives in advanced schemes, including key exchange, oblivious transfer, or secure multi-party computation. This notably extends their application spectrum, and has led to a sequence of publications at leading venues such as IEEE S&P, CRYPTO, and EUROCRYPT in the past[3,6,10,11,29, 41]. However, one important unresolved problem is that adversaries can break the security of all these advanced protocols if they gain physical access to the employed Strong PUFs after protocol completion [41]. It has been formally proven[49] that this issue cannot be overcome by techniques on the protocol side alone, but requires resolution on the hardware level - the only fully effective known countermeasure being so-called Erasable PUFs. Building on this work, this paper is the first to describe a generic method how any given silicon Strong PUF with digital CRP-interface can be turned into an Erasable PUFs[36]. We describe how the Strong PUF can be surrounded with a trusted control logic that allows the blocking (or "erasure") of single CRPs. We implement our approach, which we call "GeniePUF", on FPGA, reporting detailed performance data and practicality figures. Furthermore, we develop the first comprehensive definitional framework for Erasable PUFs. Our work so re-establishes the effective usability of Strong PUFs in advanced cryptographic applications, and in the realistic case adversaries get access to the Strong PUF after protocol completion.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationASHES 2020 - Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages21-33
ISBN (Electronic)9781450380904
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 13 Nov 2020
Externally publishedYes
Event4th ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security, ASHES 2020 - Virtual, Online, United States
Duration: 13 Nov 2020 → …

Conference

Conference4th ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security, ASHES 2020
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityVirtual, Online
Period13/11/20 → …

Funding

Chenglu Jin was supported by NSF award CNS 1617774, NYU CCS, and NYU CUSP. Wayne Burleson was supported by NSF/SRC grant CNS-1619558. Marten van Dijk was supported by NSF award CNS 1617774. Ulrich Rührmair acknowledges support by BMBF-project QUBE and by BMBF-project PICOLA. Finally, we would like to thank the reviewers for their very valuable comments!

FundersFunder number
BMBF-project
NSF/SRCCNS-1619558
National Science FoundationCNS 1617774

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