Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays exploring risk creation in the banking sector. The essays examine how conflicting interests can compromise the objectivity, judgment, and decision making of economic agents. Consequently, they may prioritize their personal or institutional interests over the best interests of others or the entire financial system.
Chapter 2 delves into the conflict of interest that arises when a bank serves as an investor in the stock market. Chapter 3 revisits the discussion of the potential misalignment between sovereign incentives and the collective interests of the currency union, particularly in the bond market. Chapter 4 draws attention to a situation where regulations in the banking sector may be advantageous for a government in the sovereign bond market. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at the flip side of the coin, examining how banks may be susceptible to moral hazard concerns in their FX lending decisions, given that they do not fully bear the consequences of their actions.
Original language | English |
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Qualification | PhD |
Awarding Institution |
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Supervisors/Advisors |
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Award date | 14 Feb 2024 |
Print ISBNs | 9789036107211 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 14 Feb 2024 |
Keywords
- Financial stability
- Conflicts of interest
- Security holdings
- Insider risk
- Bank regulation
- Intermediary asset pricing
- Segmentation in bond pricing
- Eligibility premium
- Currency risk
- Strategic risk-taking