Abstract
Unpossessed evidence abounds. There is much to be seen and much to be had.
Much of it will never have an impact on our epistemic standings, but some of
it does. Some evidence is such that we are blameworthy for not having it, and
there is a tricky question about how to delineate this class of evidence. In this
paper, I address and propose a solution to the dilemma posed by lazy agents
on the one hand and agents facing exceptional evidence on the other. One
familiar suggestion is that agents are blameworthy when their conduct results
from their vices, and I will make a proposal which further analyses such vices
in terms of exceptionality facts.
Much of it will never have an impact on our epistemic standings, but some of
it does. Some evidence is such that we are blameworthy for not having it, and
there is a tricky question about how to delineate this class of evidence. In this
paper, I address and propose a solution to the dilemma posed by lazy agents
on the one hand and agents facing exceptional evidence on the other. One
familiar suggestion is that agents are blameworthy when their conduct results
from their vices, and I will make a proposal which further analyses such vices
in terms of exceptionality facts.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-18 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Ergo |
Volume | 2017 |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |