Gender beliefs and cooperation in a public goods game

J. Vyrastekova, E.-M. Sent, I. van Staveren

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review


This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent, however, but show more variance than those of men. The contributions to the public good are driven by gender beliefs, and after controlling for them, contributions do not depend on the gender group composition directly.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1148-1153
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes


Dive into the research topics of 'Gender beliefs and cooperation in a public goods game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this