Group Ignorance: An Account Based on Case Studies of Fundamentalist and White Ignorance

Group ignorance is a common phenomenon. But exactly what is it for a group to be ignorant? This is the question that we seek to answer in this chapter. After a few important distinctions regarding ignorance, it provides two case studies of group ignorance: fundamentalist ignorance and white ignorance. The chapter formulates six desiderata that an account of group ignorance should meet: (i) ignorance can cross group lines in the sense that it does not always follow the boundaries of social groups; (ii) there is often heterogeneity within the group: one person can be more ignorant than another and some people may not even be ignorant at all; (iii) group ignorance can be caused by the group’s epistemic vices or virtues, or by the group’s epistemic agency; (iv) at least in some cases group ignorance is not just the aggregate of individual ignorance; (v) some cases are cases of disbelieving ignorance, whereas other cases are cases of unconsidered, deep, or complete ignorance; and (vi) group ignorance comes in degrees. Subsequently, it argues that existing accounts of group belief, group justification, and group knowledge cannot easily be transposed to group ignorance. The chapter then lays out an original Dynamic Account of group ignorance and replies to several objections that might be leveled against it.