Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao, J.R. van den Brink

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-44
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
Volume225
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

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Dividends
Axiomatic characterization
Cooperative game
Graph
Communication
Myerson value

Bibliographical note

February 2015, Volume 225, Issue 1, pp 27-44

Cite this

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title = "Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems",
abstract = "This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure.",
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Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems. / Algaba, E.; Bilbao, J.M.; van den Brink, J.R.

In: Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 225, No. 1, 2015, p. 27-44.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

AU - Algaba, E.

AU - Bilbao, J.M.

AU - van den Brink, J.R.

N1 - February 2015, Volume 225, Issue 1, pp 27-44

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure.

AB - This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure.

U2 - 10.1007/s10479-012-1216-0

DO - 10.1007/s10479-012-1216-0

M3 - Article

VL - 225

SP - 27

EP - 44

JO - Annals of Operations Research

JF - Annals of Operations Research

SN - 0254-5330

IS - 1

ER -