Abstract
Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 12 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-15 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Games |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 24 Feb 2019 |
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Keywords
- Cooperation
- Experimental games
- Gossip
- Power
- Punishment
Cite this
}
Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to promote cooperation in Social Dilemmas. / Molho, Catherine; Balliet, Daniel; Wu, Junhui.
In: Games, Vol. 10, No. 1, 12, 24.02.2019, p. 1-15.Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to promote cooperation in Social Dilemmas
AU - Molho, Catherine
AU - Balliet, Daniel
AU - Wu, Junhui
PY - 2019/2/24
Y1 - 2019/2/24
N2 - Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.
AB - Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Experimental games
KW - Gossip
KW - Power
KW - Punishment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85067626575&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85067626575&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3390/g10010012
DO - 10.3390/g10010012
M3 - Article
VL - 10
SP - 1
EP - 15
JO - Games
JF - Games
SN - 2073-4336
IS - 1
M1 - 12
ER -