How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

Katinka J P Quintelier, Lieuwe Zijlstra

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

When scholars problematize is/ought inferences (IOI's), they sometimes refer to Hume's or Moore's fallacy (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam and Evans, 2011). Although inferring "ought" from "is" can be problematic, we argue that, in the context of contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences, invoking Hume or Moore might be misguided. This is because Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.

Original languageEnglish
Article number503
JournalFrontiers in Psychology
Volume5
Issue numberMAY
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Fingerprint

Cognitive Science

Keywords

  • Defeasible reasoning
  • Deontic "oughts,"
  • Deontic reasoning
  • Epistemic "oughts,"
  • Is/ought gap
  • Is/ought inferences
  • Naturalistic fallacy

Cite this

@article{de23ecc2db5d4737b32dfafdd1e4af39,
title = "How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences",
abstract = "When scholars problematize is/ought inferences (IOI's), they sometimes refer to Hume's or Moore's fallacy (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam and Evans, 2011). Although inferring {"}ought{"} from {"}is{"} can be problematic, we argue that, in the context of contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences, invoking Hume or Moore might be misguided. This is because Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.",
keywords = "Defeasible reasoning, Deontic {"}oughts,{"}, Deontic reasoning, Epistemic {"}oughts,{"}, Is/ought gap, Is/ought inferences, Naturalistic fallacy",
author = "Quintelier, {Katinka J P} and Lieuwe Zijlstra",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503",
language = "English",
volume = "5",
journal = "Frontiers in Psychology",
issn = "1664-1078",
publisher = "Frontiers Media",
number = "MAY",

}

How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences. / Quintelier, Katinka J P; Zijlstra, Lieuwe.

In: Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 5, No. MAY, 503, 2014.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

AU - Quintelier, Katinka J P

AU - Zijlstra, Lieuwe

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - When scholars problematize is/ought inferences (IOI's), they sometimes refer to Hume's or Moore's fallacy (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam and Evans, 2011). Although inferring "ought" from "is" can be problematic, we argue that, in the context of contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences, invoking Hume or Moore might be misguided. This is because Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.

AB - When scholars problematize is/ought inferences (IOI's), they sometimes refer to Hume's or Moore's fallacy (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam and Evans, 2011). Although inferring "ought" from "is" can be problematic, we argue that, in the context of contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences, invoking Hume or Moore might be misguided. This is because Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.

KW - Defeasible reasoning

KW - Deontic "oughts,"

KW - Deontic reasoning

KW - Epistemic "oughts,"

KW - Is/ought gap

KW - Is/ought inferences

KW - Naturalistic fallacy

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84904471339&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84904471339&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503

DO - 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503

M3 - Article

VL - 5

JO - Frontiers in Psychology

JF - Frontiers in Psychology

SN - 1664-1078

IS - MAY

M1 - 503

ER -