TY - JOUR
T1 - How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences
AU - Quintelier, Katinka J P
AU - Zijlstra, Lieuwe
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - When scholars problematize is/ought inferences (IOI's), they sometimes refer to Hume's or Moore's fallacy (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam and Evans, 2011). Although inferring "ought" from "is" can be problematic, we argue that, in the context of contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences, invoking Hume or Moore might be misguided. This is because Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.
AB - When scholars problematize is/ought inferences (IOI's), they sometimes refer to Hume's or Moore's fallacy (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam and Evans, 2011). Although inferring "ought" from "is" can be problematic, we argue that, in the context of contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences, invoking Hume or Moore might be misguided. This is because Hume's and Moore's arguments concern the validity and soundness of deductive inferences while in our view contemporary IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.
KW - Defeasible reasoning
KW - Deontic "oughts,"
KW - Deontic reasoning
KW - Epistemic "oughts,"
KW - Is/ought gap
KW - Is/ought inferences
KW - Naturalistic fallacy
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U2 - 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503
DO - 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84904471339
SN - 1664-1078
VL - 5
JO - Frontiers in Psychology
JF - Frontiers in Psychology
IS - MAY
M1 - 503
ER -