In Praise of Manipulation

Keith Dowding, Martin Van Hees

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the sincerity argument, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the transparency argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume38
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2008

Fingerprint

manipulation
decision-making process
transparency
voting

Cite this

@article{48cc3a7f85464bd489fde9ad107c3d10,
title = "In Praise of Manipulation",
abstract = "Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the sincerity argument, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the transparency argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.",
author = "Keith Dowding and {Van Hees}, Martin",
year = "2008",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S000712340800001X",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "1--15",
journal = "British Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0007-1234",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

In Praise of Manipulation. / Dowding, Keith; Van Hees, Martin.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, 01.2008, p. 1-15.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - In Praise of Manipulation

AU - Dowding, Keith

AU - Van Hees, Martin

PY - 2008/1

Y1 - 2008/1

N2 - Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the sincerity argument, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the transparency argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

AB - Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the sincerity argument, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the transparency argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

U2 - 10.1017/S000712340800001X

DO - 10.1017/S000712340800001X

M3 - Article

VL - 38

SP - 1

EP - 15

JO - British Journal of Political Science

JF - British Journal of Political Science

SN - 0007-1234

ER -