Incentives at the counter: An empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the Netherlands

Wilko Bolt, Nicole Jonker*, Corry van Renselaar

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for card payments. However, such rules are prohibited in the Netherlands. Dutch retailers are allowed to surcharge consumers for debit card use. This setting permits an empirical analysis of the impact of surcharging card payments on merchant acceptance and consumer payment choice. Based on consumer and retailer survey data, our analysis shows that surcharging steers consumers away from using debit cards towards cash. Half of the observed difference in debit card payment shares across retailers can be explained by this surcharge effect. Removing debit card surcharges may induce cost savings of more than EUR 50 million in the long run.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1738-1744
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Banking and Finance
Volume34
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2010

Keywords

  • Cost efficiency
  • No-surcharge rule
  • Retail payments
  • Survey data

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