Infinite Epistemic Regress and Internalism

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification. © 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)221-231
JournalMetaphilosophy Series in Philosophy
Volume45
Issue number2
Early online date3 Apr 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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Regress
Internalism
Metaphilosophy
Foundationalism
Epistemic Regress Problem
Justification
Coherentism
Infinitism

Cite this

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Infinite Epistemic Regress and Internalism. / Meester, R.W.J.; van Woudenberg, R.

In: Metaphilosophy Series in Philosophy, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2014, p. 221-231.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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