Inflation or unemployment? Who cares?

Iman Van Lelyveld*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In the last two decades a large number of game-theoretic models describing monetary policy have been used to examine the characteristics of policies over a wide range of 'rules of the game'. Regardless of the specification of the model, the degree of inflation aversion - relative to unemployment - plays an important role. In this paper I estimate inflation aversion at the individual level from survey data, and test the theoretical assumptions used for various models. The results show that income has a small role in explaining aversion to inflation and that redistributional motivation and political inclination have more significant effects.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)463-484
Number of pages22
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume15
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 1999

Keywords

  • E31
  • E52
  • Game-theory
  • Inflation
  • Monetary policy
  • Output-inflation preferences
  • Survey

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Inflation or unemployment? Who cares?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this