Is Business Failure Due to Lack of Effort? Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample

M. Ejrnaes, S. Hochguertel

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Does insurance provision reduce entrepreneurs' effort to avoid business failure? We exploit unique features of the voluntary Danish unemployment insurance (UI) scheme, that is available to the self-employed. Using a large sample of self-employed individuals, we estimate the causal effect of insurance choice on the probability to become unemployed. Identification of the insurance choice comes from eligibility conditions for an early retirement plan, accessible only to UI members. We find that those who are insured are 2 percentage points more likely to become unemployed subsequently compared with the uninsured, however only 0.6 percentage points are caused by moral hazard. The Economic Journal © 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
LanguageEnglish
Pages791-830
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume123
Issue number571
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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Business failures
Empirical evidence
Insurance
Economic journals
Unemployment insurance
Moral hazard
Early retirement
Causal effect
Entrepreneurs

Cite this

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Is Business Failure Due to Lack of Effort? Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample. / Ejrnaes, M.; Hochguertel, S.

In: Economic Journal, Vol. 123, No. 571, 2013, p. 791-830.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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