Is the label ‘conspiracy theory’ a cause or a consequence of disbelief in alternative narratives?

Karen M. Douglas*, Jan Willem van Prooijen, Robbie M. Sutton

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

289 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Using the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is widely perceived to be a way of discrediting wild ideas and unsubstantiated claims. However, prior research suggests that labelling statements as conspiracy theories does not reduce people's belief in them. In four studies, we probed this effect further, and tested the alternative hypothesis that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is a consequence rather than a cause of (dis)belief in conspiracy-related statements. Replicating prior research, Study 1 (N = 170) yielded no evidence that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ affects belief in statements. In Study 2 (N = 199), we discovered that the less people believed in statements, the more they favoured labelling them as ‘conspiracy theories’. In Studies 3 and 4 (Ns = 150 and 151), we manipulated the relative believability of statements and found that participants preferred the label ‘conspiracy theory’ for relatively less believable versus more believable statements. The current research therefore supports the hypothesis that prior (dis)agreement with a statement affects the use of the label ‘conspiracy theory’ more than the other way around.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)575-590
Number of pages16
JournalBritish Journal of Psychology
Volume113
Issue number3
Early online date17 Dec 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The British Psychological Society.

Keywords

  • conspiracy theories
  • conspiracy theory
  • labelling
  • stigmatized beliefs

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Is the label ‘conspiracy theory’ a cause or a consequence of disbelief in alternative narratives?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this