Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This article studies the effect of parliamentary involvement on security policy. Building on Democratic Peace Theory, it examines whether democracies with a parliamentary veto power are indeed less likely to participate in military interventions, than democracies without such a veto power, ceteris paribus. By studying patterns of participation across 25 to 35 countries in five military missions, this paper finds modest evidence for such a parliamentary peace and suggests that it depends on the character of the military mission in question. If a mission is framed as a test case of alliance solidarity, as was the case with OEF and the Iraq War, domestic institutional constraints can be trumped by alliance politics. If, however, countries enjoy more discretion in deciding on the use of force, domestic constraints such as parliamentary war powers have a tangible impact on government policy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)121-134
Number of pages14
JournalBritish Journal of Politics and International Relations
Volume20
Issue number1
Early online date22 Jan 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2018

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military intervention
Kosovo
democracy
peace
Military
politics
security policy
Iraq
government policy
solidarity
participation
evidence

Keywords

  • democratic peace theory
  • Iraq War
  • Kosovo
  • military intervention
  • parliamentary peace
  • veto power

Cite this

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Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh. / Wagner, Wolfgang.

In: British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1, 02.2018, p. 121-134.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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