Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences

Malte Dold, Menusch Khadjavi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We present a three-player queuing game to study procedural preferences in a laboratory experiment. Together with markets, queues and waiting lists are universal procedures for allocating goods and services. We designed our queuing game to disentangle motivations of outcome-oriented egoistic preferences, outcome-oriented distributional (inequality aversion) preferences and outcome-independent procedural preferences. In a series of treatments, we introduce a market element and allow two of the three players to bargain over a queue jump, thus violating the queuing procedure. A third player is able to engage in peer punishment to sanction queue jumping. We provide evidence that a simple model of procedural preferences is able to explain the behavior of a share of the subjects in our experiment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)127-137
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume102
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Inequality aversion
  • Laboratory experiment
  • Procedural preferences
  • Queuing

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