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Leveraging hardware isolation for process level access control & authentication

  • S.K. Haider
  • , H. Omar
  • , I. Lebedev
  • , S. Devadas
  • , M. Van Dijk

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

© 2017 Association for Computing Machinery.Critical resource sharing among multiple entities in a processing system is inevitable, which in turn calls for the presence of appropriate authentication and access control mechanisms. Generally speaking, these mechanisms are implemented via trusted software "policy checkers" that enforce certain high level application-specific "rules" to enforce a policy. Whether implemented as operating system modules or embedded inside the application ad hoc, these policy checkers expose additional attack surface in addition to the application logic. In order to protect application software from an adversary, modern secure processing platforms, such as Intel's software Guard Extensions (SGX), employ principled hardware isolation to offer secure software containers or enclaves to execute trusted sensitive code with some integrity and privacy guarantees against a privileged software adversary. We extend this model further and propose using these hardware isolation mechanisms to shield the authentication and access control logic essential to policy checker software. While relying on the fundamental features of modern secure processors, our framework introduces productive software design guidelines which enable a guarded environment to execute sensitive policy checking code - hence enforcing application control flow integrity - and afford flexibility to the application designer to construct appropriate high-level policies to customize policy checker software.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSACMAT 2017 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages133-141
ISBN (Electronic)9781450347020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 7 Jun 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event22nd ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, SACMAT 2017 - Indianapolis, United States
Duration: 21 Jun 201723 Jun 2017

Conference

Conference22nd ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, SACMAT 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityIndianapolis
Period21/06/1723/06/17

Funding

The work is partially supported by NSF grants CNS-1413920 and CNS-1413996 for MACS: A Modular Approach to Cloud Security.

FundersFunder number
National Science FoundationCNS-1413996, CNS-1413920

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