Life history strategy and human cooperation in economic games

J. Wu, D.P. Balliet, J.M. Tybur, S. Arai, P.A.M. van Lange, T. Yamagishi

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

493 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Across five studies using samples from both Japan and United States (N = 2345), we take a multi-method approach to test the prediction from life history theory that a slow, compared to fast, life history strategy promotes investment in cooperative relationships. Studies 1 and 2 examined how different measures as proxies for life history strategy (i.e., Mini-K and High-K Strategy Scale) relate to cooperation in various economic games. Studies 3 to 5 measured early childhood environments (i.e., childhood harshness and unpredictability), manipulated resource scarcity using previously validated methods, and then measured cooperation. Across our studies, we also examined four hypothesized psychological mechanisms that could explain the relation between life history strategy and cooperation: temporal discounting, concern for reputation, social value orientation, and trust in others. Overall, we found no support for the hypothesis that life history strategy predicts cooperation or that early childhood environments interact with current resource scarcity to predict cooperation. Thus, our initial findings imply that life history theory may not account for individual variation in cooperation with unknown others.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)496-505
Number of pages10
JournalEvolution and Human Behavior
Volume38
Issue number4
Early online date20 Mar 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2017

Funding

This research was supported in part by fellowship from China Scholarship Council (201206040030) awarded to Junhui Wu, and the “International Postdoctoral Exchange Fellowship Program” by China Postdoctoral Council.

FundersFunder number
China Postdoctoral Council
China Scholarship Council201206040030

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Life history strategy and human cooperation in economic games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this