Abstract
Abstract Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 569-585 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Journal of Philosophical Logic |
Volume | 35 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2006 |