Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation

Marc Pauly, Martin Van Hees

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Abstract  Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)569-585
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2006

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