Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

Uyanga Turmunkh; Martijn J. Van den Assem; Dennie Van Dolder

doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159

Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

Uyanga Turmunkh
, Martijn J. Van den Assem
, Dennie Van Dolder

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Abstract

We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	4795-4812
Journal	Management Science
Volume	65
Issue number	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159
Publication status	Published - Oct 2019

Funding

History: Accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making. Funding: This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council via the Network for Integrated Behavioural Sciences [Grant ES/K002201/1] and the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek [Grant 452-16-011]. Supplemental Material: Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159.

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Keywords

Cheap talk
Communication
Cooperation
Deception
Game show
Lying aversion
Prisoner’s dilemma

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10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159

Malleable Lies_Communication and Cooperation in a High StakesTV Game ShowFinal published version, 1.42 MBLicence: Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2919331

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Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

Abstract

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UN SDGs

Keywords

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