Massa tegen macht: Hoe de waakzaamheid van massa's de veerkracht van democratieën kan versterken

At the beginning of the 21st century, outraged masses are manifesting themselves on the political stage in various democracies around the world. International examples include the 2003 mass protests against the war in Iraq, Los Indignados in Spain, the worldwide Occupy movement, #MeToo and Black Lives Matter protests in the United States, and Le mouvement des Gilets jaunes in France. But there are also Dutch examples, such as the protests against centers for asylum-seekers, Extinction Rebellion, and farmers’ protests. Occasionally, outraged masses even transform into mad mobs, for example, the storming of the Capitol in Washington DC in 2021 and the Brazilian parliament in 2023. And prior to that in the Netherlands, the municipal council in Geldermalsen in 2015 and the provincial government building in Groningen in 2019 were stormed. These outraged masses make political elites in democracies insecure: they don’t know how they could or should deal with these masses. Should they suppress and limit them, or engage with and accommodate them? In this dissertation, I develop and investigate the thesis that democratic decision-making procedures can channel the indignation of masses. The guiding idea is that periodic elections no longer suffice to channel the indignation of masses, because social media platforms have changed how these masses form and operate. The risk is that indignant masses take unlawful paths and attack, weaken, and imperil democracies. I want to explore whether – if we modify the design of periodic elections or add other decision-making procedures – indignant masses can also complement and strengthen democracies, and make them resilient. To improve the self-correcting capacity of democracies, I propose a model of democratic deescalation in which periodic elections are supplemented by citizens’ initiatives, deliberative forums and referenda that allow outraged masses to influence and control political elites between periodic elections. Does this not undermine parliamentary democracy? No, not with the right combination of designs that offer democracies three moments of deliberation and reflection. Outraged masses have the opportunity, first, to put proposals on the political agenda through citizens’ initiatives; then, to improve those proposals by exchanging ideas with other citizens through deliberative forums; and, finally, if necessary, to correct political elites through referenda. Each of these three steps is followed by an intermediate step in which political elites can de-escalate the conflict by adopting all or part of citizens' proposals. Then, if citizens feel insufficiently heard, they can escalate the conflict to the next step, under the condition that they gather enough support to prevent frivolous use or abuse. So, in the most extreme case, political elites get three chances to de-escalate a conflict before new elections are called. A carefully designed combination of these democratic decision-making procedures can make democracies representative, responsive, and robust. Representative, because they quickly reveal society's outrage. Responsive, because they translate the outrage of masses into policy. And robust, because they protect the self-correcting capacity of democracy. If democracies are and remain willing to learn and adapt to changing circumstances by anticipating the return of masses and calibrating the design of democratic institutions, democracies may even become antifragile, where, instead of becoming weaker, they actually become stronger from indignant masses. Indeed, in that case, outraged masses strengthen the resilience of democracies.