MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS

Xiaoming Cai; Pieter Gautier; Ronald Wolthoff

doi:10.1111/iere.12592

MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS

Xiaoming Cai
, Pieter Gautier^*
, Ronald Wolthoff

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This article shows how meeting frictions affect equilibrium trading mechanisms and allocations in an environment where identical sellers post mechanisms to compete for buyers with ex ante heterogeneous private valuations. Multiple submarkets can emerge, each consisting of all sellers posting a particular mechanism and the buyers who visit those sellers. Under mild conditions, high-valuation buyers are all located in the same submarket, and low valuation buyers can be in: (i) the same submarket, (ii) a different submarket, and (iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii). The decentralized equilibrium is efficient when sellers can post auctions with reserve prices or entry fees.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	155-185
Number of pages	31
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	64
Issue number	1
Early online date	10 Jun 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12592
Publication status	Published - Feb 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Authors. International Economic Review published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS

Abstract

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