Abstract
In a recent paper, Agatti (1993) proposed an identity for theoretical psychology. The present comment argues, first, that Agatti's concept of theory is too narrow to accommodate theoretical psychology in the sense of theory building. It is then pointed out that metapsychology is neglected. In this connection it is finally contended that in psychology, being a so-called ‘high-level’ science, metapsychology is essential and, hence, that Agatti's concept of theoretical psychology in general is also too narrow. © 1996, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 293-300 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Theory and Psychology |
| Volume | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1996 |
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