Moral hinges and steadfastness

Chris Ranalli

doi:10.1111/meta.12499

Moral hinges and steadfastness

Chris Ranalli^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Epistemology and Metaphysics

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how hinge theorists can explain the existence of moral hinge propositions, which enables them to account for the rational permissibility of being steadfast in response to disagreements over fundamental moral convictions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	379-401
Number of pages	23
Journal	Metaphilosophy
Volume	52
Issue number	3-4
Early online date	8 Jul 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12499
Publication status	Published - Jul 2021

Bibliographical note

Special Issue: Metatheories of Disagreement.

Funding Information:
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a workshop on disagreement at Sheffield University (20 July 2019) and at the Meta-theories of Disagreement conference at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (17?18 October 2019). I would like to thank the audiences there for their helpful feedback. Special thanks also to P?ter Hartl and ?kos Gyarmathy for their support and to two anonymous referees for Metaphilosophy for their helpful suggestions that led me to improve the essay. Research for this essay was supported by a Vidi grant (276-20-024) from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Thanks to VU Amsterdam and the NWO for their support.

Funding Information:
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a workshop on disagreement at Sheffield University (20 July 2019) and at the ‐ conference at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (17–18 October 2019). I would like to thank the audiences there for their helpful feedback. Special thanks also to Péter Hartl and Ákos Gyarmathy for their support and to two anonymous referees for for their helpful suggestions that led me to improve the essay. Research for this essay was supported by a Vidi grant (276‐20‐024) from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Thanks to VU Amsterdam and the NWO for their support. Meta theories of Disagreement Metaphilosophy

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Author. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Funding

Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a workshop on disagreement at Sheffield University (20 July 2019) and at the Meta-theories of Disagreement conference at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (17?18 October 2019). I would like to thank the audiences there for their helpful feedback. Special thanks also to P?ter Hartl and ?kos Gyarmathy for their support and to two anonymous referees for Metaphilosophy for their helpful suggestions that led me to improve the essay. Research for this essay was supported by a Vidi grant (276-20-024) from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Thanks to VU Amsterdam and the NWO for their support. Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a workshop on disagreement at Sheffield University (20 July 2019) and at the ‐ conference at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (17–18 October 2019). I would like to thank the audiences there for their helpful feedback. Special thanks also to Péter Hartl and Ákos Gyarmathy for their support and to two anonymous referees for for their helpful suggestions that led me to improve the essay. Research for this essay was supported by a Vidi grant (276‐20‐024) from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Thanks to VU Amsterdam and the NWO for their support. Meta theories of Disagreement Metaphilosophy

Funders	Funder number
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia	276‐20‐024
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia

Keywords

disagreement
epistemic conservatism
fundamental convictions
moral encroachment
moral hinges

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1111/meta.12499

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Cite this

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abstract = "Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how hinge theorists can explain the existence of moral hinge propositions, which enables them to account for the rational permissibility of being steadfast in response to disagreements over fundamental moral convictions.",

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note = "Special Issue: Metatheories of Disagreement. Funding Information: Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a workshop on disagreement at Sheffield University (20 July 2019) and at the Meta-theories of Disagreement conference at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (17?18 October 2019). I would like to thank the audiences there for their helpful feedback. Special thanks also to P?ter Hartl and ?kos Gyarmathy for their support and to two anonymous referees for Metaphilosophy for their helpful suggestions that led me to improve the essay. Research for this essay was supported by a Vidi grant (276-20-024) from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Thanks to VU Amsterdam and the NWO for their support. Funding Information: Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a workshop on disagreement at Sheffield University (20 July 2019) and at the ‐ conference at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (17–18 October 2019). I would like to thank the audiences there for their helpful feedback. Special thanks also to P{\'e}ter Hartl and {\'A}kos Gyarmathy for their support and to two anonymous referees for for their helpful suggestions that led me to improve the essay. Research for this essay was supported by a Vidi grant (276‐20‐024) from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Thanks to VU Amsterdam and the NWO for their support. Meta theories of Disagreement Metaphilosophy Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 The Author. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.",

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Moral hinges and steadfastness

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

UN SDGs

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