Network formation with heterogeneous players

A. Galeotti; S. Goyal; J.J.A. Kamphorst

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

Network formation with heterogeneous players

A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, J.J.A. Kamphorst

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic

Abstract

This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks. © 2005 Elsevier inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	353-372
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	54
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003
Publication status	Published - 2006

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10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

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title = "Network formation with heterogeneous players",

abstract = "This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks. {\textcopyright} 2005 Elsevier inc. All rights reserved.",

author = "A. Galeotti and S. Goyal and J.J.A. Kamphorst",

year = "2006",

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003",

language = "English",

volume = "54",

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journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

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AU - Goyal, S.

AU - Kamphorst, J.J.A.

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AB - This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks. © 2005 Elsevier inc. All rights reserved.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 54

SP - 353

EP - 372

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -