Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa

M.D. Konig; Fabrizio Zilibotti; Mathias Thoenig; Dominic Rohner

doi:10.3982/ECTA13117

Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa

M.D. Konig
, Fabrizio Zilibotti
, Mathias Thoenig
, Dominic Rohner

Spatial Economics

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of
military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We obtain a closed-form characterization of the Nash equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. The estimates of the fighting externalities are then used to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) dismantling specific fighting groups involved in the conflict; (ii) weapon embargoes; (iii) interventions aimed at pacifying animosity among groups. Finally, with the aid of a random utility model, we study how policy shocks can induce a reshaping of the network structure.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1093-1132
Number of pages	40
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	85
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13117
Publication status	Published - 2017

Funding

We would like to thank Valentin Muller, Sebastian Ottinger, André Python, Timo Schaefer, Matthias Schief, Nathan Zorzi, and Laura Zwyssig for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for helpful comments to the editor, five anonymous referees, Daron Acemoglu, Jerome Adda, Alberto Alesina, Alessandra Casella, Ernesto Dal Bo, Melissa Dell, Rachel Griffith, David Hemous, Macartan Humphreys, Massimo Morelli, Benjamin Olken, María Sáez Martí, Uwe Sunde, Chris Udry, Fernando Vega Redondo, Jean-Marc Robin, David Yanagizawa-Drott, and Giulio Zanella. We owe a special thanks to Rafael Lalive for his generous help on an important coding issue discussed in the paper. We also thank conference and seminar participants at ENCORE, ESEM-Asian Meeting, IEA World Congress, INFER, LLN, NBER Summer Institute, Workshop on the Economics of Organized Crime, and at the universities of Aalto, Bocconi, Bologna, CERGE-EI, Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Chicago, Columbia, ECARES, Ecole Polytechnique, European University Institute, Geneva, Harvard/MIT, HKU, IAE-Barcelona, IIES, IMT, INSEAD, IRES, Keio, Lausanne, LSE, Luxembourg, Manchester, Marseille-Aix, Munich, Nottingham, NYU Abu Dhabi, Oxford, Oslo, Pompeu Fabra, SAET, SciencesPo Paris, Southampton, St. Gallen, Toulouse, ULB, and USI-Lugano. Mathias Thoenig acknowledges financial support from the ERC Starting Grant GRIEVANCES-313327. Dominic Rohner gratefully acknowledges funding from the Swiss National Fund Grant 100017_150159 on “Ethnic Conflict.” Michael König and Fabrizio Zilibotti acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation through the research grant 100018_140266, and Michael König further acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation Grant PZ00P1_154957/1.

Funders	Funder number
IAE-Barcelona
European Commission
University of Hong Kong
European University Institute, Geneva
ECARES
Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse
Fondation de l'École Polytechnique
International Institute for Environmental Studies
European Resuscitation Council	GRIEVANCES-313327
Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung	100017_150159, PZ00P1_154957/1, 150159, 100018_140266, 154957, 100018
Seventh Framework Programme	313327

Keywords

Civil War
Congo
Great War of Africa
economic development
ethnic conflict
networks
random utility model

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10.3982/ECTA13117

https://www.econometricsociety.org/publications/econometrica/2017/07/01/networks-conflict-theory-and-evidence-great-war-africa

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Cite this

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abstract = "We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We obtain a closed-form characterization of the Nash equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. The estimates of the fighting externalities are then used to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) dismantling specific fighting groups involved in the conflict; (ii) weapon embargoes; (iii) interventions aimed at pacifying animosity among groups. Finally, with the aid of a random utility model, we study how policy shocks can induce a reshaping of the network structure.",

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AB - We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We obtain a closed-form characterization of the Nash equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. The estimates of the fighting externalities are then used to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) dismantling specific fighting groups involved in the conflict; (ii) weapon embargoes; (iii) interventions aimed at pacifying animosity among groups. Finally, with the aid of a random utility model, we study how policy shocks can induce a reshaping of the network structure.

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UR - https://www.horizonte-magazin.ch/2018/03/08/netzwerke-im-krieg/

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Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa

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Keywords

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