Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm, M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.

Original languageEnglish
JournalTOP
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2020

Fingerprint

Bankruptcy
Game
Non-transferable utility
Coalitions
Convexity
Directly proportional
Cover
Compromise

Keywords

  • Adjusted proportional rule
  • Coalition-merge convexity
  • Compromise stability
  • NTU-bankruptcy game
  • NTU-bankruptcy problem
  • Ordinal convexity

Cite this

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza ; Borm, Peter ; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria. / Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games. In: TOP. 2020.
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Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games. / Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria.

In: TOP, 2020.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AU - Estévez-Fernández, Arantza

AU - Borm, Peter

AU - Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria

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