TY - GEN
T1 - Offline untrusted storage with immediate detection of forking and replay attacks
AU - Van Dijk, M.
AU - Rhodes, J.
AU - Sarmenta, L.F.G.
AU - Devadas, S.
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - We address the problem of using an untrusted server with only a trusted timestamping device (TTD) to provide trusted storage for a large number of clients, where each client may own and use several different devices that may be offline at different times and may not be able to communicate with each other except through the untrusted server (over an untrusted network). We show how a TTD can be implemented using currently available Trusted Platform Module TPM 1.2 technology without having to assume trust in the BIOS, CPU, or OS of the TPM's server. We show how the TTD can be used to implement tamper-evident storage where clients are guaranteed to immediately detect illegitimate modifications to their data (including replay attacks and forking attacks) whenever they wish to perform a critical operation that relies on the freshness and validity of the data. In particular, we introduce and analyze a log-based scheme in which the TTD is used to securely implement a large number of virtual monotonic counters, which can then be used to time-stamp data and provide tamper-evident storage. We present performance results of an actual implementation using PlanetLab and a PC with a TPM 1.2 chip. © 2007 ACM.
AB - We address the problem of using an untrusted server with only a trusted timestamping device (TTD) to provide trusted storage for a large number of clients, where each client may own and use several different devices that may be offline at different times and may not be able to communicate with each other except through the untrusted server (over an untrusted network). We show how a TTD can be implemented using currently available Trusted Platform Module TPM 1.2 technology without having to assume trust in the BIOS, CPU, or OS of the TPM's server. We show how the TTD can be used to implement tamper-evident storage where clients are guaranteed to immediately detect illegitimate modifications to their data (including replay attacks and forking attacks) whenever they wish to perform a critical operation that relies on the freshness and validity of the data. In particular, we introduce and analyze a log-based scheme in which the TTD is used to securely implement a large number of virtual monotonic counters, which can then be used to time-stamp data and provide tamper-evident storage. We present performance results of an actual implementation using PlanetLab and a PC with a TPM 1.2 chip. © 2007 ACM.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78649309769&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1314354.1314364
DO - 10.1145/1314354.1314364
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 41
EP - 48
BT - STC'07 - Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing
T2 - 2nd ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing, STC'07
Y2 - 2 November 2007 through 2 November 2007
ER -