On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games

V. Pruzhansky

    Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademic


    We characterize strategy sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb) in extensive games of perfect information and finite horizon. It is shown that any such game possesses only one minimal curb set, which necessarily includes all its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Applications of this result are twofold. First, it lessens computational burden while computing minimal curb sets. Second, it implies that the profile of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies is always stochastically stable in a certain class of games.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)205-210
    Number of pages6
    JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
    Publication statusPublished - 2003


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