On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games

J.R. van den Brink, R. Levinsky, M. Zeleny

    Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review


    The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. A proper Shapley value, introduced in Vorob’ev and Liapounov (Game Theory and Applications, vol IV. Nova Science, New York, pp 155–159, 1998), assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. In this contribution we investigate these proper Shapley values in the context of monotone games. We prove their existence for all monotone transferable utility games and discuss other properties of this solution.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)449-471
    JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - 2015

    Bibliographical note

    May 2015, Volume 44, Issue 2, pp 449-471


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