Abstract
This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set. © The Author(s) 2009.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 301-310 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 68 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |