TY - JOUR
T1 - On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and the Harsanyi imputations
AU - Derks, G.
AU - van der Laan, G.
AU - Vasil'ev, V.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set. © The Author(s) 2009.
AB - This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set. © The Author(s) 2009.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84897580597
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84897580597&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0
DO - 10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0
M3 - Article
SN - 0040-5833
VL - 68
SP - 301
EP - 310
JO - Theory and Decision
JF - Theory and Decision
ER -
