On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers

G.J. van den Berg

doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2006.10.005

On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers

G.J. van den Berg

Economics

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic

Abstract

This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid for a very wide range of distributions of valuations. The results carry over to the optimal minimum price in independent private value auctions. In addition, they can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of quantity discount price policies. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	482-491
Journal	Journal of Econometrics
Volume	141
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2006.10.005
Publication status	Published - 2007

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10.1016/j.jeconom.2006.10.005

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abstract = "This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid for a very wide range of distributions of valuations. The results carry over to the optimal minimum price in independent private value auctions. In addition, they can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of quantity discount price policies. {\textcopyright} 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

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AB - This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid for a very wide range of distributions of valuations. The results carry over to the optimal minimum price in independent private value auctions. In addition, they can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of quantity discount price policies. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers

Abstract

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