Optimal non-adaptive concession strategies with incomplete information

Tim Baarslag*, Rafik Hadfi, Koen Hindriks, Takayuki Ito, Catholijn Jonker

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review


When two parties conduct a negotiation, they must be willing to make concessions to achieve a mutually acceptable deal, or face the consequences of no agreement. Therefore, negotiators normally make larger concessions as the deadline is closing in. Many time-based concession strategies have already been proposed, but they are typically heuristic in nature, and therefore, it is still unclear what is the right way to concede toward the opponent. Our aim is to construct optimal concession strategies against specific classes of acceptance strategies. We apply sequential decision techniques to find analytical solutions that optimize the expected utility of the bidder, given certain strategy sets of the opponent. Our solutions turn out to significantly outperform current state of the art approaches in terms of obtained utility. Our results open the way for a new and general concession strategy that can be combined with various existing learning and accepting techniques to yield a fully-fledged negotiation strategy for the alternating offers setting.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRecent Advances in Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation
EditorsKatsuhide Fujita, Valentin Robu, Naoki Fukuta, Minjie Zhang, Takayuki Ito
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783319303055
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event7th International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation, ACAN 2014 - Paris, France
Duration: 1 May 2014 → …

Publication series

NameStudies in Computational Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1860-949X


Conference7th International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation, ACAN 2014
Period1/05/14 → …


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