Abstract
According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although imperative theories constitute an apparently promising version of strong intentionalism, they cannot provide an imperative content that meets their own criteria of sufficiency and necessity. I further argue that this issue cannot be solved by impure imperative theories either.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 104-126 |
| Journal | Journal of Consciousness Studies |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 9-10 |
| Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Funding
Many thanks to my research unit at the Ruhr University Bochum as well as Peter Clutton, Ross Pain, Stephan Mann, and Frédérique de Vignemont for their helpful comments. My special thanks go to Colin Klein, who has shaped and supported my work in numerous ways. Funded by the Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) — Projektnummer GRK-2185/1 (DFG-Graduiertenkolleg Situated Cognition); funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) — project number GRK-2185/1 (DFG Research Training Group Situated Cognition).
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| DFG-Graduiertenkolleg | |
| Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft | GRK-2185/1 |
| Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft |
