Political economy of dynamic resource wars

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The political economy of exhaustible resource extraction is analysed in three contexts. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of being removed once and for all by a rival faction, extraction becomes more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, perennial political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or the partisan in-office bias is large and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if constitutional cohesiveness is weak, the incumbent has a partisan in-office bias, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, governments can be less frequently removed from office, and fighting technology has less decreasing returns to scale. Resource depletion in such wars is more rapacious if there is more government instability, the political system is less cohesive, and the partisan in-office bias is smaller.

LanguageEnglish
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2019

Fingerprint

political economy
resource
returns to scale
political conflict
political instability
resource depletion
political system
fighting
wage
office
Political economy
Resources
Incumbents
Government
Factions

Keywords

  • Cohesiveness
  • Contests
  • Dynamic resource wars
  • Exploitation investment
  • Hold-up problem
  • Partisan bias
  • Political conflict
  • Rapacious depletion

Cite this

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title = "Political economy of dynamic resource wars",
abstract = "The political economy of exhaustible resource extraction is analysed in three contexts. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of being removed once and for all by a rival faction, extraction becomes more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, perennial political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or the partisan in-office bias is large and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if constitutional cohesiveness is weak, the incumbent has a partisan in-office bias, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, governments can be less frequently removed from office, and fighting technology has less decreasing returns to scale. Resource depletion in such wars is more rapacious if there is more government instability, the political system is less cohesive, and the partisan in-office bias is smaller.",
keywords = "Cohesiveness, Contests, Dynamic resource wars, Exploitation investment, Hold-up problem, Partisan bias, Political conflict, Rapacious depletion",
author = "{van der Ploeg}, Frederick",
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journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",
issn = "0095-0696",
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Political economy of dynamic resource wars. / van der Ploeg, Frederick.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2019.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AB - The political economy of exhaustible resource extraction is analysed in three contexts. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of being removed once and for all by a rival faction, extraction becomes more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, perennial political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or the partisan in-office bias is large and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if constitutional cohesiveness is weak, the incumbent has a partisan in-office bias, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, governments can be less frequently removed from office, and fighting technology has less decreasing returns to scale. Resource depletion in such wars is more rapacious if there is more government instability, the political system is less cohesive, and the partisan in-office bias is smaller.

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