Private Roads

Research output: Working paperProfessional

Abstract

This paper studies the efficiency impacts of private toll roads in initially untolled networks. The analysis allows for capacity and toll choice by private operators, and endogenizes entry and therewith the degree of competition, distinguishing and allowing for both parallel and serial competition. Two institutional arrangements are considered, namely one in which entry is free and one in which it is allowed only after winning an auction in which patronage is to be maximized. Both regimes have the second-best zero-profit equilibrium as the end-state of the equilibrium sequence of investments. But the auctions regime approaches this end-state more rapidly: tolls are set equal to their second-best zero-profit levels immediately, and capacity additions for the earlier investments are bigger. When discreteness of capacity is relevant and limits the number of investments that can practically be accommodated, the auctions regime may therefore still result in a more efficient end-state, with a higher social surplus, although the theoretical end-state is the same as under free entry.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationAmsterdam
PublisherTinbergen Instituut
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameDiscussion paper TI
No.07-093/3

Fingerprint

Auctions
Roads
Profit
Surplus
Patronage
Free entry
Institutional arrangements
Degree of competition
Operator
Serials

Cite this

Verhoef, E. T. (2007). Private Roads. (Discussion paper TI; No. 07-093/3). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Instituut.
Verhoef, Erik T. / Private Roads. Amsterdam : Tinbergen Instituut, 2007. (Discussion paper TI; 07-093/3).
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Verhoef, ET 2007 'Private Roads' Discussion paper TI, no. 07-093/3, Tinbergen Instituut, Amsterdam.

Private Roads. / Verhoef, Erik T.

Amsterdam : Tinbergen Instituut, 2007. (Discussion paper TI; No. 07-093/3).

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Verhoef ET. Private Roads. Amsterdam: Tinbergen Instituut. 2007. (Discussion paper TI; 07-093/3).