Abstract
Promoting prosocial behavior toward future generations is crucial to combat societal challenges such as climate change and the depletion of natural resources. Here, we invoke a social dilemma lens to predict and promote future-oriented prosociality in four preregistered online experiments (total N = 2407). Integrating research on temporal preferences with research on social preferences, we show that (i) individuals are willing to make self-costly contributions to future beneficiaries without personal return on investment; (ii) universally prosocial preferences predict such future-oriented prosociality most strongly, and (iii) individuals with weakly or strongly parochial preferences can also be motivated toward future-oriented prosociality if the future beneficiary of their contributions is aligned with their social preferences, i.e., when the future beneficiary is part of an in-group. This is true for both minimal groups (Studies 2–3) and real-world groups (Study 4). Our findings suggest that policies aimed at promoting people's future-oriented prosociality could be made more effective by tailoring to the beneficiary of their prosociality in the future.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 102387 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-10 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Journal of Environmental Psychology |
| Volume | 98 |
| Early online date | 3 Aug 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 The Authors
Funding
Supporting H1, participants' overall contributions were smaller in the future condition (M = 6.54, SD = 3.06) compared to the present condition (M = 7.13, SD = 3.05), t (813) = 2.78, p = 0.006, Cohen's d = 0.19, 95% CI [0.06, 0.33]. However, they did show larger-than-zero contributions to each of the future-oriented contribution pools; universalism: M = 3.25, SD = 3.00, t (412) = 22.01, 95% CI [2.96, 3.54], Cohen's d = 1.08; weakly parochial prosociality: M = 2.28, SD = 2.30, t (412) = 20.18, 95% CI [2.06, 2.51], Cohen's d = 0.99); strongly parochial prosociality: M = 1.01, SD = 1.80, t (412) = 11.36, 95% CI [0.83, 1.18], Cohen's d = 0.56. Thus, the different group-based social preferences reflected by the IPUC pools are still relevant for decision makers when there is no return on investment and their contributions only affect future players.The results provide additional support for H1: Overall contributions are higher in the standard IPUC (M = 7.53, SD = 2.41) than in the future versions of the game (combined over the three conditions M = 5.14, SD = 2.87), t (582) = 19.74, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.72, 0.91], Cohen's d = 0.82. Importantly, group-based social preferences for allocations in the present as assessed by the IPUC game predicted future-oriented contributions. Supporting H2, stepwise forward regressions showed that future-oriented universal prosociality was most strongly predicted by present universal preferences, \u03B2 = 0.38, t [193] = 5.68, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.25, 0.52], Adj R2 = 0.14. Adding weakly parochial preferences, \u03B2 = 0.30, t [193] = 4.29, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.21, 0.56], \u0394 R2 = 0.08, and then strongly parochial preferences to the model, \u03B2 = 0.20, t [193] = 2.75, p = 0.007, 95% CI [0.09, 0.54], \u0394 R2 = 0.03, explained less although still significant variance in future-oriented prosociality. Interestingly, stepwise forward regressions showed that future-oriented weakly parochial prosociality was also most strongly predicted by present universal preferences, \u03B2 = 0.45, t [189] = 6.99, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.30, 0.53], Adj R2 = 0.20. Weakly parochial preferences were the second best predictor, \u03B2 = 0.35, t [189] = 5.28, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.25, 0.56], \u0394 R2 = 0.10, thereby not fully supporting H2. Strongly parochial preferences explained less variance, \u03B2 = 0.15, t (189) = 2.08, p = 0.039, 95% CI [0.01, 0.41], \u0394 R2 = 0.02. Finally, stepwise forward regressions showed that future-oriented strongly parochial prosociality was most strongly predicted by present strongly parochial preferences, \u03B2 = 0.20, t (195) = 2.87, p = 0.005, 95% CI [0.11, 0.59], Adj. R2 = 0.04, providing further support for our hypothesis. Both present weakly parochial preferences, \u03B2 = 0.19, t (195) = 2.67, p = 0.008, 95% CI [0.06, 0.40], \u0394 R2 = 0.03, and present universal preferences, \u03B2 = 0.27, t (195) = 3.08, p = 0.002, 95% CI [0.10, 0.47], \u0394 R2 = 0.04, significantly explained additional variance. Taken together, these findings partially point to a congruency effect: Contributions to the future increase when their implications for in-group and out-group members align with present social preferences.Replicating the previous studies and further supporting H1, total contributions in the baseline IPUC were higher overall (M = 6.89, SD = 3.10) than in the future-oriented game (averaged across four conditions, M = 5.30, SD = 3.66), t (764) = 13.03, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.40, 0.55], Cohen's d = 0.47.We further were able to replicate the results regarding which group-based social preferences were most predictive of different future-oriented contributions using stepwise (forward) regressions: First, supporting H2, future-oriented universal prosociality (singular universal condition) was most strongly predicted by present universal preferences, \u03B2 = 0.34, t (185) = 4.98, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.23, 0.54], Adj. R2 = 0.11, followed by present weakly parochial, \u03B2 = 0.33, t [185] = 4.49, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.24, 0.62], \u0394 R2 = 0.09, and present strongly parochial preferences, \u03B2 = 0.18, t [185] = 2.68, p = 0.008, 95% CI [0.11, 0.70], \u0394 R2 = 0.03.Third, supporting H2, stepwise (forward) regressions showed that future-oriented strongly parochial prosociality (singular strongly parochial condition) was most strongly predicted by present strongly parochial preferences, \u03B2 = 0.25, t (193) = 3.59, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.22, 0.76], Adj. R2 = 0.06, followed by weakly parochial, \u03B2 = 0.24, t (193) = 3.53, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.15, 0.53], \u0394 R2 = 0.06, and universal preferences, \u03B2 = 0.31, t (193) = 4.24, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.20, 0.54], \u0394 R2 = 0.08.Supporting H2, stepwise (forward) regressions showed that tree planting randomly in the world, mirroring future-oriented universal prosociality, was predicted mainly by present universal preferences, \u03B2 = 0.30, t (241) = 4.91, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.18, 0.43], but additionally also by present weakly parochial preferences, \u03B2 = 0.15, t (240) = 2.23, p = 0.027, 95% CI [0.02, 0.38]. No other predictors were included in the regression model, which means that these did not explain additional variance. These results mirror those of Study 3.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| IPUC | 0.91, 0.70, 13.03, 0.55, 0.56, 0.53, 0.54, 0.43, 0.76, 0.40, 0.62, 0.52, 0.41, 0.59, 0.38, 0.47 |
Keywords
- Intergenerational dilemma
- Parochial cooperation
- Social dilemma
- Social preferences