Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: Should there be a common approach to sanctioning based on the overcharge rate?

Yannis Katsoulacos, Evgenia Motchenkova, David Ulph

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We review recent theoretical literature pointing to the ineffectiveness, in terms of welfare impact, of currently applied sanctioning regimes for cartels by Competition Authorities (CAs). We then provide a comparison of the regimes taking also into account criteria related to ease of implementation and transparency. We argue the case for switching to a penalty regime, in which the penalty base continues to be the currently dominant penalty base of cartel revenue but in which, in contrast to current practice, the penalty rate is based on the rate commonly estimated in order to calculate damages in private damage claims, that is, the overcharge rate.

Translated title of the contributionPublic and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: Should there be a common approach to sanctioning based on the overcharge rate?
Original languagePortuguese
Article numbere192321
JournalRevista de Economia Contemporanea
Volume23
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2019

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Cartels
Penalty
Antitrust enforcement
Damage
Revenue
Cartel
Transparency
Authority

Keywords

  • Antitrust enforcement
  • Antitrust law
  • Antitrust penalties
  • Cartels

Cite this

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Aplicação da legislação antimonopólio pública e privada aos cartéis : Deve haver uma abordagem comum para sancionar com base na taxa de sobretaxas? / Katsoulacos, Yannis; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David.

In: Revista de Economia Contemporanea, Vol. 23, No. 2, e192321, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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