Abstract
We empirically investigate how rent control combined with the use of a non-market allocation mechanism – centralised waiting lists – affects the efficiency of housing allocation among public-housing tenants. We show that, on average, Dutch public-housing tenants consume a house whose value differs by 7.5% from what they would consume under an efficient allocation. This entails particularly large transfers in housing consumption from younger households to older households. The annual welfare loss arising from misallocation within the public-housing sector is modest, estimated at around €65 per tenant.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 105272 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-16 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
| Volume | 242 |
| Early online date | 22 Jan 2025 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2025 The Authors
Funding
This paper was supported by the NWO grant Housing Affordability and Policy. We would like to thank Viola Davis for valuable input to our analysis strategy, and Henrik Zaunbrecher for assistance in compiling data. We also thank Martijn Dröes, Rob Euwals, Rodrigo Martinez-Mazza and participants at the CPB expert seminars and at the 12th Annual European Meeting of the Urban Economics Association for their valuable comments.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek |
Keywords
- Misallocation
- Non-market allocation
- Public housing
- Rent control