R&D networks

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)686-707
Number of pages22
JournalRand Journal of Economics
Volume32
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2001

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Incentives
Rivalry
Bilateral
Inter-firm collaboration
Collaboration networks
Strategic networks
Profit
Market competition
Industry

Cite this

Goyal, Sanjeev ; Moraga-González, José Luis. / R&D networks. In: Rand Journal of Economics. 2001 ; Vol. 32, No. 4. pp. 686-707.
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R&D networks. / Goyal, Sanjeev; Moraga-González, José Luis.

In: Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 4, 12.2001, p. 686-707.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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