Rethinking Situated and Embodied Social Psychology

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This article aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology (ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social cognition is first and foremost a supra-individual, interactive, and dynamic process (Semin & Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism) claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today. © 2015, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.
LanguageEnglish
Pages411-433
Number of pages23
JournalTheory and Psychology
Volume25
Issue number4
Early online date14 May 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2015

Fingerprint

Social Psychology
Cognition
Cognitive Science
Social Environment
Social Cognition

Cite this

@article{70075368d96c45f9ad7c52dd5eae342e,
title = "Rethinking Situated and Embodied Social Psychology",
abstract = "This article aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology (ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social cognition is first and foremost a supra-individual, interactive, and dynamic process (Semin & Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism) claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today. {\circledC} 2015, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.",
author = "W. Pouw and {Looren De Jong}, H.",
year = "2015",
month = "8",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0959354315585661",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "411--433",
journal = "Theory and Psychology",
issn = "0959-3543",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "4",

}

Rethinking Situated and Embodied Social Psychology. / Pouw, W.; Looren De Jong, H.

In: Theory and Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 4, 01.08.2015, p. 411-433.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rethinking Situated and Embodied Social Psychology

AU - Pouw, W.

AU - Looren De Jong, H.

PY - 2015/8/1

Y1 - 2015/8/1

N2 - This article aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology (ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social cognition is first and foremost a supra-individual, interactive, and dynamic process (Semin & Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism) claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today. © 2015, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.

AB - This article aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology (ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social cognition is first and foremost a supra-individual, interactive, and dynamic process (Semin & Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism) claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today. © 2015, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.

U2 - 10.1177/0959354315585661

DO - 10.1177/0959354315585661

M3 - Article

VL - 25

SP - 411

EP - 433

JO - Theory and Psychology

T2 - Theory and Psychology

JF - Theory and Psychology

SN - 0959-3543

IS - 4

ER -